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Kosovo does not have any emphasized experience related to 
development and operation of independent state institutions. 
Development of power in Kosovo, which derives directly from the 
votes of citizens, happened only after the end of the conflict in 1999, 
respectively after the installation of the mission of SC of UN – UNMIK 
and organization of first elections in 2000. 
But since the establishment of first institutions until now some 
interventions were noticed, and those interventions, for a country with 
long tradition but even for Kosovo are not common and are 
unconstitutional. In Kosovo the most visible and most pronounced 
interventions happened in the work of legislature, Assembly, initially 
by the mission of UNMIK and later by the Government itself. 
Therefore, Kosovo Assembly as the highest legislative and 
representative body as it was originally intended with the 
Constitutional Framework and later with the Constitution of Republic 
of Kosovo, not rarely did not have the possibility to fulfill its 
constitutional and legal functions. 
 
The Parliament, a key political institution of the state, which in the 
past has appeared in various forms, functions and nominations, has 
since its initial appearance of the Parliamentarism as an idea had a 
primary goal in limiting or reducing the absolute power, the 
monarchic power. In the meantime, the idea of establishment of 
parliaments and determination of their functions came to develop, 
obviously with major contributions of many scholars, such as 
Montesquieu, who in his work 'spirit of law' had stated:”more of us 
would better exercise the legislative powers than a person alone', a 
statement which paved the way for the establishment of a 
representative legislative body, right on a peaking clash between the 
monarchs who wanted to preserve their 'absolute powers' by all 
means, and forces which were against concentrating all power onto a 
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single person. Therefore, it is quite apparent that the goal of both 
scholars and practitioners of the time was one: limit the power by 
creating a representative institution - the parliament, and further the 
vesting of certain authorizations to it, including the oversight role on 
other pillars, mainly the executive branch, independently of the fact 
that in various periods, these powers were exercised by different 
actors. 
Independently of the denominations which may be diverse, such 
as Parliament, Assembly, Council, Congress, etc., in practice in 
various places, and in comparative constitutional theory, there are 
principally three functions of a Parliament: 
 Legislative function; 
 Electoral function and  
 Oversight function.1 
 
Exercising all these main functions parliaments of different countries 
in the world often take a stronger role in their ability of fulfilling all 
three functions successfully, while there are also periods, such as the 
20th Century, in which the role of the Parliament lost relevance in a 
century known as a century of further weakening of the 
parliamentary power2.  
All these ideas of Parliament and parliamentarism may be 
attributed to developed countries such as UK, France and the US, 
which are also considered to be the “cradles” of democracy, but not to 
countries with major political and social problems in the period of 
development and concretisation of the Parliamentarism idea.  
Therefore, the world may be divided between the countries with 
some parliamentary practice, and the others, which for many reasons, 
lack such tradition.  
Kosovo may freely be ranked in the latter list, countries without 
much parliamentary tradition, for two reasons: 
 first, Kosovo had, even contrary to its will, until recently been 
part of the former SFRY, a country which had established 
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levels of assembly starting from Provincial, Republican and 
Federation assemblies, with fictitious roles and functions 
since everything was decided by the party – the Communist 
League of Yugoslavia, namely its chief, and  
 second, after the war Kosovo was initially administered by an 
international mission, and only in 2008 it declared its 
independence and sovereignty, and obtained its international 
recognition. 
 
Hence, since the end of the war in Kosovo, namely since the 
establishment of the first democratic institutions, originally termed 
“provisional”, the Kosovo Assembly, the highest representative and 
legislative body in Kosovo, was severely challenged by interferences, 
which ultimately prevented it from fulfilling its constitutional and 
legal duties. In a chronological analysis developments in and around 
the Assembly may be divided into two periods, albeit both resulting 
in almost identical developments for the Assembly and its role. In the 
period before the declaration of independence of Kosovo, when the 
functions of the Assembly were provided on by the Constitutional 
Framework, and the post-independence period, in which the 





After the war Kosovo was administered by the UNMIK Mission, 
which was established to perform pursuant to the UNSCR 1244. 
Following the extinction of “parallel” institutions, established by 
Albanians during the period of classic occupation of Kosovo, and 
following establishment of the Joint Institutions of Administration 
(JIAC), this administration organized the first democratic elections, 
initially local elections (in 2000), and the general elections for the 
Kosovo Assembly (2001), which pursuant to the Constitutional 
Framework was to be the highest representative and legislative 
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institution3 of the country, which was to be elected by Kosovars for 
the first time with a secret vote4, freely and in an election process 
recognized internationally. Following election and constitution of the 
Assembly, this institution was to appoint the President and the 
Government of Kosovo, undoubtedly marking Kosovo’s first step 
towards building democratic institutions, which would come out of a 
free expression of the sovereign power – the people.   
Due to the undetermined political status of Kosovo all institutions, 
both local and central, had limited competencies or better stated had 
to share such powers with international authorities in Kosovo. The 
same fate was to be lived by the Kosovo Assembly as well, because 
the SRSG’s “hands” held all three powers: legislative, executive and 
judiciary. This kind of power was absurd and non-democratic, and in 
contradiction to international norms and standards on a balanced 
division of powers, thereby allowing the Head of UNMIK to interfere 
directly with the functions of the Assembly, in two ways. In the first 
way, the SRSG was the final authority, which promulgated the laws 
which were passed through the UNMIK Regulations which were 
further signed and promulgated5 by him, while the other way was 
even more extraordinary, and it usually consisted of the political 
evaluation the SRSG made of certain actions of the Assembly.  
The most critical case was for example the issuance of a Resolution 
on borders in 2002 (on non-recognition of an agreement on borders 
between the Republic of Serbia and the FRY of Macedonia) by the 
Kosovo Assembly, and its prompt annulment thereof by the SRSG6, 
which was quoted to be an unstated “conflict” between international 
and local authorities, in this case between the SRSG and the Kosovo 
Assembly. All these matters make it easy to comprehend that the local 
institutions, and specifically the Assembly, throughout the period of 
international administration were largely challenged by international 
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authorities and their interferences with the roles disabling it from 
fulfilling its constitutional mandates to the interest of Kosovo citizens. 
The manner of promulgation of laws through UNMIK Regulations, 
the entitlement of the SRSG to intervene in legal contents by adding, 
omitting or amending parts of the law; and ultimately the annulment, 
repelling of other relevant documents issued by the Assembly, as in 
the case above, render it clear that the Assembly was more of a 
technical rubber stamp throughout the period, and had to strictly be 
subject to “political will” of the SRSG and the UNMIK in general, 
which was imposed by the SRSG through its supervision and its 
diligence in preventing excess/violation of the UNSCR 1244 and other 
regulations and acts of this mission, rather than performing pursuant 
to the Constitutional Framework, being the highest representative and 
legislative institution of the country. 
Even in the period after the declaration of independence, and the 
entry into force of the new Constitution of Kosovo, which provided 
explicitly on the authorizations of the Kosovo Assembly7, namely 
providing that the Assembly would be the highest democratic 
representative and legislative body, this institution continues to face 
with problems of almost the same nature, but now in a different level, 
in the relation with the executive branch – the Government, which 
controls the majority in the Assembly. We have quite often discussed 
about public statements of Members of Parliament about the 
“Government controlling the Assembly’s agenda”, and then some 
other statements about the Government “not even recognizing the 
role of the Assembly as an oversight institution of the Government”. 
In this sense, we had a statement by the KDI Director, an organisation 
which monitors and prepares reports on Assembly performance: “We 
witness today the fact that during 2011 (the Assembly) has not made 
any advancement in terms of preventing interferences of the 
Government in the world of the Kosovo Assembly – setting also from 
the legislative agenda, which was served by the Kosovo Government 
to the Assembly, and dictating its work”.8  
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One may only think about the beginning of the “technical” talks 
with the Republic of Serbia. The Government had already begun the 
talks without even notifying the Assembly, which afterwards with an 
initiative taken by several Members of Parliament the matter was 
opened for discussion at the Assembly, resulting thereafter in a 
resolution on “Dialogue between the Republic of Kosovo and the 
Republic of Serbia””9. The adoption of the resolution had clearly 
implied an oversight on the Government in the process of talks and 
agreements to be made with the Republic of Serbia. The oversight on 
the Government in the process of “technical talks” with the Republic 
of Serbia, a neighbouring country to the Republic of Kosovo, falls 
within the scope of constitutional authorizations of the Kosovo 
Assembly. The Constitution of Kosovo provides that the powers of the 
Assembly also include the scrutiny on the Government and other 
public institutions, which pursuant to the Constitution and laws 
report to the Assembly10, and oversight on foreign and security 
policies11.  
Another objective of the Resolution, which may be derived at by its 
content, was to support the talks, but also to limit the talks to 
“technical matters” alone, but also, as was stated, to allow for an 
additional role for the Kosovo Assembly in providing oversight on the 
process. With such a Resolution the Kosovo Assembly had bound the 
Government of Kosovo, inter alia, to provide the “substantial dialogue 
document” and the Prime Minister’s envoy, namely the head of the 
Kosovo delegation, “to report to the Assembly, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee and to plenary sessions”. Nevertheless, one may only be 
reminded of one of March sessions, in which the largest opposition 
group had requested explanations on talks from the “Chief 
Negotiator”, and her “refusing” to report, or simply stated having an 
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entirely ignoring approach towards the requests made by the 
Assembly members.12  
There are many examples to state to the fact that the Government 
as a whole, but also its individual members, perpetually try to rise 
above the Assembly and its members, or just simply reject legal 
requests made by the Assembly, which ultimately appoints the 
Government and its members. In this way, the Assembly is prevented 
from exercising its own constitutional duties, because the two 
paragraphs of the Article 65, of the Constitution provide on three 
fields the Assembly must exercise oversight on (pertaining to the 
concrete example taken), the “Government performance”, “foreign 
policy” and “security policy”, while it is clear that “technical talks” 
with the Republic of Serbia contain all three. 
With the aforementioned simple examples occurring in both 
periods of Assembly’s existence and operations, one may freely 
conclude that the Kosovo Assembly, the highest representative, 
democratic and legislative body, despite its major efforts, is still being 
avoided by the Kosovo Government, which in an other interpretation 
would mean that the Government is avoiding the will of the Kosovo 
citizens. In this manner, it is again easy to conclude that this is leading 
towards an “alienation of the institution of the Assembly”, namely, 
alienation of its key roles and functions, which are explicitly provided 
upon by the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, towards creating 
a “technical rubber stamping institution”, which only reads, reviews 
and improves draft laws of the Government, and does not oversee or 
control the Government, and an institution which is informed or 
notified only when, how much and how the Government wants to 
inform or notify it, a situation which is violation of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Kosovo. 
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